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						<h1 itemprop="headline">ODA Seminar by Sebastian Oelrich</h1>
						
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							<p class="text--intro" itemprop="description">When disclosing effective compliance backfires: Evidence from experiments with retail investors and preparers</p>
						
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														Thursday  4  September 2025,
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														&nbsp;at 14:00 -  15:00
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														ODA Section, MGMT
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									<p>The ODA Section invites you to a seminar where Sebastian Oelrich will give the following presentation:</p>
<p><strong>When disclosing effective compliance backfires: Evidence from experiments with retail investors and preparers</strong></p>
<p><strong>Abstract</strong><br> Firms voluntarily disclose information to reduce information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders by signaling positive characteristics, such as compliance or performance. However, stakeholders sometimes misinterpret such signals. Disclosing effective compliance, such as a well-used whistleblowing system, may be especially vulnerable to misinterpretation because it consists of a positive signal (i.e., well-functioning internal whistleblowing systems) and a negative signal (i.e., misconduct cases uncovered by whistleblowers). Drawing on literature from criminology, we predict that investors receiving disclosures on the number of internally detected misconduct cases fail to process the positive signal of better internal compliance, thus misinterpreting the disclosures as a purely negative signal. The results of two experiments (overall N = 1,214) with retail investors are consistent with our predictions. Holding the number of actual misconduct cases constant, we first show that investors perceive a firm as worse if it detects and discloses more misconduct cases. This result is robust to several additional manipulations. Second, we find that preparers (i.e., CEOs) anticipate this behavior and either, under voluntary reporting regimes, reduce disclosure, or, under mandatory reporting regimes, reduce their compliance efforts.</p>
<p><em>Everyone is welcome!</em></p>
								
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